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The limits of process: on (re)reading Henri Bergson 
Abstract 
This article offers a reading of the work of Henri Bergson as it pertains to organizations through the 
lens of ideas drawn from critical realism. It suggests an alternative to interpretations based on a 
stark division between process and realist perspectives. Much of the existing literature presents a 
rather partial view of Bergson’s work. A review suggests some interesting parallels with themes in 
critical realism, notably the emergence of mind.  Critical realism has a focus on process at its heart, 
but is also concerned with how the products of such processes become stabilized and form the 
conditions for action. This suggests that attention might usefully be paid to the relationship between 
organizational action and the sedimented practices grouped under the heading of ‘routines’. More 
attention to Bergson’s account of the relationship between instinct, intuition and intelligence 
provides a link to the social character of thought, something which can be mapped on to Archer’s 
work on reflexivity and the ‘internal conversation’. This suggests that our analyses need to pay 
attention to both memory and history, to building and dwelling, rather than the one-sided focus 
found in some process theory accounts.  
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The work of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, active at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
has been an important influence on ‘strong’ process perspectives on organizations and organizing. 
Used to advocate an ontology of ‘becoming’ in which reality is in a state of permanent flux and 
movement, these ideas have found crystallisation in an important Handbook (Helin et al 2014), as 
well as being used to support alternative conceptions of strategy (Chia and Holt, 2009). In turn, they 
have been influential in areas such as the study of organizational routines, giving weight to 
tendencies to stress the dynamic potential of such routines for fostering organizational change 
(Pentland et al, 2012). While Bergson is only one of many thinkers whose work has been invoked in 
the support of a strong process perspective, he offers the opportunity for a reassessment of such 
approaches. This article conducts such a reassessment through the lens of critical realism. Now, it 
might be expected that such a reassessment would involve the counter-posing of conceptions of 
structure to the focus on flows in processual thinking. That is indeed part of the story, but only part 
of it. What an examination of Bergson indicates is not only that there is more to his work than 
existing accounts would indicate but, just as important, that critical realism is just as concerned with 
process and movement as with order and stability. Not only does such an examination suggest some 
limits to process, but it also points to areas for the refinement of the critical realist project in 
organization studies. 
The article starts by considering how Bergson’s work has been used. One observation from this 
discussion is that supplied by Weik (2011), who observes that the polarized nature of the discussion 
means that alternatives to stylized and stereotyped positions are not considered. This provides a 
reason for considering the relationship between Bergson, process and critical realism. It is 
recognised that there is little direct consideration but that addressing the questions raised by 
process theorists enables us to pull out some of the focus on process in critical realist approaches. 
This leads to a focus on some specific elements of Bergson’s thought, notably questions of 
emergence in the context of the mind-brain relationship and the nature of the distinction between 
instinct, intuition and intelligence. I use examples drawn from the study of organizational routines to 
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illustrate the interplay between instinct, as situated action, and intelligence, as generalizing from 
such action and sedimenting learning in specific practices. This discussion both suggests some limits 
to the focus on flows in strong process thinking and the need for those in the critical realist tradition 
of organizational analysis to take practices more seriously.  
Uses of Bergson 
It is worth noting that many mentions of Bergson in the journal literature are made in passing, as 
either a marker of a broad adherence to a processual perspective or as support for a wider more 
conventional argument about organizational change.1 This often done without direct reference to 
Bergson’s work. In addition, there is a small subset of articles which use Bergson’s work on humour 
to examine that specific topic (Westwood, 2004; Korczynski, 2011). As a specialised area of 
endeavour, they will not be considered in detail here. If we set these articles aside, then in the 
remainder it is noticeable how often Bergson’s ideas are mediated through the work of other 
thinkers (Linstead, 2014: 230). Of particular prominence here is the work of Deleuze, either alone or 
in tandem with Guattari.  At least five articles have Deleuze as their major focus, with recognition of 
his re-working of Bergsonian ideas (Wood and Ferlie, 2003; Thanem, 2006; Linstead and Thanem, 
2007; Hjorth and Pelzer, 2007; Painter-Morland and Deslandes, 2014). Other thinkers cited where 
Bergson is seen as an influence are Whitehead, Sartre, Weick and Mead (Cunliffe and Luhman, 2004; 
Simpson, 2009; Bakken and Hennes, 2006; Weber and Glynn, 2006). The influence on American 
pragmatism is brought out in Wood and Ferlie (2003: 54) who claim to couple the 
‘phenomenological intuitionism of Bergson (1912) and the radical empiricism of James’ in their 
analysis. This connection with the work of William James is one to which we will return. What one 
also notes is that the use of Bergson is often restricted to a rather narrow range of his work, with 
                                                          
1 The claims made in this section are based on articles which mention Bergson in either Organization Studies or 
Organization from 1993 to 2014. This does not purport to be an exhaustive, systematic, bibliographical 
analysis, but rather to focus on the literature where the main contributions have occurred. The focus on 
European journals reflects, as Meyer and Boxenbaum (2010) note, that references to Bergson tend to reflect a 
particularly European style of research. The discussion is supplemented with other material, but is not claimed 
to be comprehensive.  
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only a handful of articles making reference to several of his works. In a population of 35 articles in 
which Bergson’s name appears, 12 make no direct reference to his work.  The biggest, number, 16, 
use only one source, with the most frequently used work being Creative Evolution. This points to the 
serious and direct engagement with his work being limited to a handful of authors, most notable 
amongst whom is Robert Chia (1997, 1998). Because of this, the focus of the following discussion is 
on his work, complemented by that of Stephen Linstead (2014) and  Ajit Nayak (2008), as authors 
who have engaged most comprehensively with Bergson’s work. 
It is Chia who most clearly expresses the fundamental point which Bergson is recruited to support: 
the ontological notion that what we term reality is in a state of permanent becoming. As he puts it: 
The actual world is fundamentally in a process of becoming so that every phenomena of 
which we are aware - from galaxies to electrons, from human beings to amoebae, from 
human societies and families of crystals to nursery rhymes and creational myths - each exist 
only as a stabilized moment in an interminable process of becoming (Chia, 1997: 696). 
The consequence is that the object of our study is regarded as a by-product of the process of 
becoming. ‘Individuals, organizations and societies,’ argue Nayak and Chia,  ‘are deemed to be 
epiphenomena of primarily fluxing and changing patterns of relationships and event clusterings (Chia 
and Nayak, 2011: 283).This discussion is based on an example that Bergson uses to illustrate the 
problem of movement. First, we have to recognise a key distinction, that between intelligence and 
instinct.  The former is ‘is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to any law 
and of recomposing into any system’ (Bergson, 1960: 165).  Thus, when looking at the movement of 
an arm, intelligence, in the form of analytical science, breaks it down into a series of discrete points 
which can be mapped in space. However, no matter how sophisticated the measurement and how 
close together the points, this can never capture the movement itself. For this reason, argues 
Bergson, ‘The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life’ (Bergson, 1960: 
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174). A true comprehension of movement and thus of evolution rested on intuition, a lived 
sympathy with the flow of consciousness. As he argued 
To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility, we must break with scientific habits 
which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the 
mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of 
philosophy (Bergson, 1960: 31). 
He was particularly concerned to resist the claims of ‘psychophysics’, that is the attempt to combine 
the growing prestige of physics with the rapid development of the discipline of psychology at the 
closing years of the nineteenth century (Bergson, 1910: 61). For him, any attempt to measure 
consciousness was invalid, for it was to mistake the homogeneous nature of points in space, where 
any one point could be exchanged with another, with what he termed the ‘qualitative multiplicity’ of 
consciousness (Bergson, 1910: 122). 
This led him to the notion of ‘duration’. Pure duration was the property of consciousness in ‘the flow 
is continuous and in which we pass insensibly from one state to another: a continuity which is really 
lived, but artificially decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge’ (Bergson, 
2007: 243). This duration was sustained by memory, which retained and developed the sense of self. 
Memory operated at two levels: motor mechanisms and independent recollections (Bergson, 2007: 
87). Because of memory, the past was ever intruding on the present. As he argued 
What are we, in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we 
have lived from our birth - nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal 
dispositions? Doubtless we  think with only a small part of our past,  but it is with our entire 
past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then, as a 
whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a 
small part of it only is known in the form of idea (Bergson, 1960: 5). 
6 
 
The problem comes with how to know this world. Here, the resources and achievements of science 
are misleading. They have ‘led to a falsely held view of reality in which the prevailing assumption 
remains that movement and change are epiphenomenal aspects of an essentially stable reality that 
can be systematically investigated and unproblematically represented through the established 
symbolic codes of modern science’ (Chia, 1998: 356).  Wood and Ferlie (2003: 54) put this most 
starkly when they stress ‘the alinear, multiple and the heterogeneous over the linear, predicatable 
and homogeneous and in which primacy is placed on process, transformation and flux: the becoming 
of things over the realist primacy on substance, stability, and order’. The adequacy of these stark 
distinctions is a matter to which we will return, but much of the discussion of Bergson is related to 
epistemological concerns once a world in flux is accepted. 
This is why a good deal of the focus is on intuition as a method. For Nayak (2008: 173), ‘intuition, in 
the Bergsonian sense, is a precise method to deepen and enhance our understanding of reality as 
movement.’ In what does this method consist? Firstly it involves, according to Nayak ‘strenuous 
effort’ in order ‘to think against our habitual grain of thought’.  This means that ‘Intuition as a 
method is not easy to understand. The task of intuition is to ‘think beyond’ by gaining ‘intellectual 
sympathy’ with lived experience that is movement’ (Nayak, 2008: 180, 181). But how is this to be 
done? The first move is to focus on defining problems rather than uncovering them. ‘Thus,’ Nayak 
(2008: 182) argues,  ‘ the first step in the method of intuition is to ‘invent’ true problems.’ Having 
done this, then how are we to investigate such problems? Why, we are ‘to reveal the experience of 
duration’ (Nayak, 2008: 182). And how is this to be done – by thought. ‘ I emphasize,’ argues Nayak 
(2008: 187), ‘ a way towards organizing thought rather than specific end-points, hypotheses or 
findings’. I have laboured this point a little, for the ‘precise method’ proves, at least in the hands of 
Nayak, to be anything but. We end up with suggestions about ways of thinking, ways which are 
taken up, too, in Shotter’s argument. In his clearly labelled ‘Understanding Process From Within: An 
Argument for ‘Withness’ Thinking,  he suggests that this mode of thinking means  
7 
 
of thinking about changes in a living, indivisible state of affairs from the outside in terms of 
them going through a sequence of separate immobile spatial configurations, we can begin to 
think in accord with their changing nature from within our living relations with them. For, if 
we can allow ourselves to be spontaneously responsive to the temporal unfolding of their 
expressive movements, then we can, of course, find that same unfolding movement within 
our own bodily felt experience (Shotter, 2006: 586). 
It is such injunctions that lead Weik (2011) to suggest that there is a tendency toward solipsism, in 
which we are obliged to trust to the introspection of the analyst to obtain insights into the modes of 
becoming of others and of wider phenomena, such as organizations. There is an inherent problem, 
here, for Bergson himself stressed both the difficulty and rareness of such introspection. ‘The 
moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare’, he argues (Bergson, 1910: 20).  Interestingly he 
suggests that, subject to the problems of language, which render static something which is in 
motion, that it is artists who offer insights.  A novelist, for example, might make  ‘us reflect by giving 
outward expression to something of that contradiction, that interpenetration, which is the very 
essence of the elements expressed. Encouraged by him, we have put aside for an instant the veil 
which we interposed between our consciousness and ourselves’ (Bergson, 1910: 133).  Chia (1998: 
359), too, argues that ‘the clearest form of penetrating intuition comes to us from the work of great 
artists’. Chia and Holt (2009: 144-150) echo this point, drawing on, for example, the paintings of J. 
M. W. Turner and Gothic architecture.   (Examples of work which seek to develop this position are 
Beyes and Steyaert (2011) and Borch (2009)). This is a point to which I will return below.  
However, before doing so I also need to stress is the extent to which Bergson was concerned with 
the problems of consciousness, which he related to deep inner feelings.  
The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of 
ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into 
homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the 
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external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; we “are acted” rather 
than act ourselves (Bergson, 1910: 231). 
It is this world of deep feelings, the ‘real’ self  buried deep within each individual, rather than the 
shadow world of the social with which he was primarily concerned. While one recognises a more 
social dimension in his work on humour, in the organizational literature, as we have seen, this is 
bracketed off as a very specific contribution. What is noticeable in the process discussions is the way 
in which discussion slips from Bergson’s focus on consciousness into a consideration of the social. 
For example, in Wood and Ferlie’s (2003: 64) discussion of evidence-based healthcare there is the 
following statement: ‘clinical services and research  information 'melt into and permeate one 
another, without precise outlines' (Bergson 1910: 104).’ The citation from Bergson is from Time and 
Free Will in a discussion of consciousness and duration, in which he argues that ‘pure duration might 
well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, 
without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, 
without any affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity’ (Bergson, 1910: 104) That is an 
argument about deep consciousness, as outlined above, not about the social. To argue that aspects 
of the social have blurred boundaries seems legitimate; it might be thought, however, that it is not 
so legitimate to slip so easily from the psychological to the social. However, this is what we find 
when the work of Bergson is advocated as a model for organizational analysis. Thus Calori (2002: 
137) moves from observing Bergson’s comment on the limitations of deduction ‘in the psychological 
and moral sciences’ to a ‘hence, in organization studies’. This slippage between a discussion which, 
in Bergson’s hands, is illuminating about matters of psychology to one which makes claims about the 
social world is to be seen starkly in Chia’s discussion when he moves from his outline of Bergson’s 
ontology of becoming, derived from his discussion of consciousness, to an argument that we need to 
move to analyses of organizing as ‘a generic reality-structuring feature of modernity’ (Chia, 1998: 
363).  Here he cites as exemplars the work of Weber, Foucault and Elias. Now, given what we know 
about Weber’s dismissal of psychology except as it applied to exceptional cases, this seems an 
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unwarranted jump (Ghosh, 2008: 254). This is not to say that Weber was ‘right’, but simply to point 
to the elision of the psychological and the social in the hands of strong process theorists. 
 
What also seems apparent from their work is an almost Manichean division between ‘science’ and 
its other, the other in this case being process perspectives. This is seen most clearly in Chia’s (1998: 
356) phrase about ‘the entire attitude of modern science’. On this count, science tout court ‘revolves 
around the axis of centred thinking which itself is predicated upon the prior spatializing and 
quantification of natural and social phenomena’ (Chia, 1998: 356). Setting aside the debates within 
physics sparked by the mysteries of quantum mechanics, as explored, for example, by Barad (2007; 
see also Norris (2000)), this seems to be an altogether too sweeping characterisation of aspects of 
science such as biology. We will consider this further below, but this extreme polarisation, Weik 
(2011) persuasively suggests, means that approaches which do not share the scienticism that Chia 
and others seem to have in mind, one associated with physics, mathematics and aspects of some 
disciplines, such as economics, one which seeks to reduce reality to symbolic quantification, are 
overlooked. Thus Hernes and Bakken (2003: 1524)  note that in only contrasting two possibilities 
Chia ‘excludes the possibility of recursivity, which in many ways tries to avoid the structure-process 
opposition.’ The same authors argue, on a similar basis, for further consideration of Whitehead’s 
work (Bakken and Hennes, 2006). Another approach, one which I will argue also takes process 
seriously, is that of critical realism, and it is to a reading of Bergson informed by critical realism that I 
turn next. 
Some preliminary comments on Bergson’s oeuvre are in order before considering some aspects of it 
in conjunction with critical realism. An excellent introduction to his life and intellectual biography is 
supplied by Linstead (2014), so this overview is concerned with some broad observations. One is the 
degree to which Bergson was engaged by some of the scientific controversies and debates of his day. 
This gives the lie to any idea that he dismissed the gains of science. In his consideration of Matter 
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and Memory, for example, he engaged with contemporary work on the brain; in Time and Free Will 
he refers to draws on, amongst others,  “Professor William James [who] drew the attention of 
physiologists to certain phenomena which had been but little remarked, although they were very 
remarkable’ (Bergson, 1910: 22). This perhaps gives a slightly dated feel to some of his work, given 
that much of this material has been superseded by the remarkable advances of science during the 
twentieth century. However, it is the observations which he drew which remain pertinent, as we 
shall see. The second observation is to cement that made above that Bergson was particularly 
exercised by the phenomenon of consciousness. As Schatzki (2006: 1867) notes, there is some doubt 
about the advisability of extrapolating consciousness at the level of individuals to that at the level of 
groups. This needs to be borne in mind when we consider the applicability or otherwise of Bergson’s 
ideas to the social world. 
Critical realism 
 
What follows is necessarily selective in its treatment of both Bergson and critical realism. In the case 
of the latter there is a large and growing body of work. This has often seen, by both supporters and 
detractors alike, as being centrally concerned with structure (Reed, 2005; Contu and Willmott, 
2005). That is an important consideration, to be sure, but in what follows I focus on aspects of the 
approach which stress process, albeit in articulation with structures and in a way which might 
challenge strong process theorizing. In so doing, however, I wish to start with an observation which 
supports the focus of both Bergson and Chia on the aesthetic as a means of knowing. The 
philosopher of science, Hilary Rose (1994: 25), working in the critical realist tradition, observes 
‘Perhaps truth in the strong sense used by Rorty et al. never exists outside the certainty of 'true 
forme', which I get when I read a poem or a novel.’ That is, while the critical realist project argues 
that some explanations of the world are better than others, those explanations are always 
provisional and open to correction.  
11 
 
Those informed by critical realism have worked in a wide variety of domains. It remains the case that 
the main intellectual inspiration for the project at a philosophical level, Roy Bhaskar, made only 
passing and rather dismissive mentions of Bergson. In a 1982 symposium on the interface between 
social theory and social science he lumps ‘Bergsonian intutionism’ together with other examples of 
what he takes to be ‘immaterialism’ (although it is interesting to note that none of the other 
distinguished contributors so much as mentions Bergson in a collection with a strong focus on mind) 
(Bhaskar, 1982: 278). In considering Nietzsche in a work dedicated to Problems of Philosophy and 
their Resolution, Bergson is brought in to support a contention of Nietzsche’s  that ‘language 
necessarily falsifies reality in the interests of biological survival’ (Bhaskar, 1994: 199) .  Some of 
Bhaskar’s suspicion may have been generated by Bergson’s invocation of élan vital, carrying with it 
overtones of vitalism. Linstead (2014) associates this with creativity, Brown (2006) with organizing 
itself, but it is noticeable here that most of those whose work we have been reviewing, with the 
exception of Calori (2002), do not address this question of the spirit animating human life, perhaps 
with good cause.  Will was the driving force of evolution, argued Bergson: 
So that all life, animal and vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to accumulate 
energy and then let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which it 
will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work. That is what the vital impetus, passing 
through matter, would fain do all at once (Bergson, 1960: 267).  
Since those words, of course, science has moved on, most notably with the discovery of DNA. The 
danger here, of course, is with forms of genetic determinism which threaten to reduce human 
consciousness to the interplay of genetic material. The counter to this, however, is not the positing 
of some mysterious spirit but the recognition of emergence as a counter to reductionism. We can 
see this in critical realism in the work of Ian Moll on the interface between psychology and biology. 
Here, Moll uses Bergson, alongside Spinoza and Marx, as part of his argument ‘that mind is an 
emergent property of brain rather than identical with it’ (Moll, 2004: 51). It is clear, as Linstead 
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(2014: 223) points out, that Bergson is sharply opposed to any conception which reduces thought 
and consciousness to the material functioning of the brain. As Bergson put it while ‘the intensity of a 
sensation bears witness to a more or less considerable work accomplished in our organism; but it is 
the sensation which is given to us in consciousness, and not this mechanical work’ (Bergson, 1910: 6-
7). Reviewing work on damage to the brain, he recognised that bodily activity was necessary but that 
science had indicated that in none of such cases  ‘do we find memories localized in certain cells of 
the cerebral substance and abolished by their destruction’ (Bergson, 2007: 153). This is a prescient 
observation which advances in the science of the brain confirm, but which is helped not by regarding 
mind and memory as some sort of free floating ‘elan vital’, but as an emergent property. 
Understanding this requires a brief consideration of two important concepts in the critical realist 
canon, stratification and emergence. 
For critical realists there are two senses in which reality is stratified (Sayer, 1992). A distinction is 
made between the empirical, the actual and the real, the real being the mechanisms that produce 
the states of the matter that we investigate. There is a second sense which is important here, and 
which is shared with other non-reductionist perspectives. This is that we can see reality as consisting 
of levels, each of which has mechanisms and properties proper to that level but out of which are 
produced phenomena which cannot, once emergent, be reduced to those mechanisms and 
properties. Thus, matter emerges from certain physical properties at the level of particles that 
combine to produce properties which are chemical in nature. Certain arrangements at this level 
produce biological organisms which possess properties which cannot be dissolved into their 
constituent parts without losing what it is that makes them effective organisms. From such biological 
material, in the case of human organisms, emerge psychological and, argue critical realists, social 
properties. In this particular case, the biological material we are concerned with is the brain, out of 
which emerges mind. Scientists such as Damasio (1994) and Rose (1993) have shown how even 
when regions of the brain which are specialized to specific tasks are damaged, that the mind is 
capable of reorganizing itself to preserve functioning. Rose, in particular, draws on critical realism to 
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argue for the emergent properties of mind, what Archer would term, as we will see below, a 
‘personal emergent property’. This then provides an alternative to any notion of vitalism. 
Consciousness is not some sort of free floating universal spirit, but an emergent property of 
particular arrangements that constitute a specific organism, arrangements that emerge from but are 
not reducible to material properties. This is one way in which Bergsonian insights can be maintained 
without adhering to a strong view of process. However, this is to remain at the level of the individual 
organism. Ideas drawn from critical realism both develop Bergsonian ideas of consciousness and, 
crucially, give them a social dimension. 
This social dimension is supplied by the work of Margaret Archer. Two preliminary observations are 
in order. The first is that Archer is best known for her work on the relationship between structure 
and agency (Archer, 1995). In her discussion of morphogenesis, structures such as markets and 
religions are the product of human activity, but, once emergent from that activity, endure to provide 
the objectives circumstances in which subsequent rounds of that activity takes place. However, her 
work has been concerned to suggest that the relationship between agency and structure is mediated 
by agential reflexivity, though the mechanism of the internal conversation (Archer, 2000, 2003). This 
leads to the second observation, that in developing these ideas she in no place draws on Bergson. 
However, a crucial part of the development is a close engagement with the work of William James, 
especially his observations on the nature of consciousness and the possibilities of access to it. As we 
noted above, Bergson and James shared similar approaches and concerns. It seems legitimate, 
therefore, to explore Archer’s discussion, not least because it throws new light onto the use of 
Bergson’s ideas. 
Archer’s (2003) use of James is only a small part of her development of the notion of the ‘internal 
conversation’, something she suggests James hinted at but which was lost in the later work of the 
American pragmatists. She outlines, and endorses, James’ account of the inherently interior and 
subjective nature of thought. James is, she argues ‘perfectly clear about the distinction between 
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abstract ideas and particular thoughts; the former belong to the public domain whilst the latter are 
intrinsically private’ (Archer, 2003: 58). Although Archer never draws on Bergson, we can see striking 
parallels here. Where, however, her account departs from some of those we have reviewed above is 
in discounting the possibility of introspection for grasping these thoughts. As she notes “James 
steadily elaborates the incompatibilities between his conception of the 'stream of consciousness', of 
thought streaming over time, and the fundamental introspective notion of being able to 'look at it'’ 
(Archer, 2003: 60). This is for two reasons. One is that many thoughts are fleeting and inchoate, 
unable to be inspected before they have vanished. More importantly, simultaneously producing 
thoughts and inspecting them implies a split consciousness, able to act as subject and object 
simultaneously. One solution to this problem is then not introspection but retrospection, in which 
the best we can hope for is reporting of thoughts after they have occurred. However, as Archer 
notes, ‘The life of the mind is fundamentally Heraclitan, for it never descends twice into the same 
stream’ (Archer, 2003: 60). This makes accurate retrieval of memories for inspection an impossibility. 
In many ways this critique mirrors those which draw on Bergson to challenge ‘ocularcentrism’, or the 
primacy of the visual in knowing the world (Kavanagh, 2004). However, it is noticeable that the 
injunctions from ‘strong’ process theorists, such as Nayak (2008), cling to the centrality of 
introspection. 
In this sense, Archer’s discussion is more faithful to the qualities of thought that both Bergson and 
James map out. Her suggestion is that James supplied some clues about an alternative monitoring of 
thought, one which involved talking and listening, rather than sight. She uses this to develop her 
notion of the internal conversation. This is not the place to explore these rich ideas in more detail, 
save to note two important points. One is that this account is explicitly characterised as a 
‘processural and tendential account of thinking’ (Archer, 2003: 99). The second is that this account 
of the interior life of thought is connected to the social. This is where her earlier work on the ways in 
which enduring structures and cultures form situational logics for action forms a crucial context for 
her account of thought. Her own summary expresses this best: 
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(i) Structural and cultural properties objectively shape the situations which agents confront 
involuntarily, and possess generative powers of constraint and enablement in relation to 
(ii) Agents' own configuration of concerns, as subjectively defined in relation to the three 
orders of natural reality - nature, practice and society. 
iii) Courses of action are produced through the reflexive deliberations of agents who 
subjectively determine their practical projects in relation to their objective circumstances 
(Archer, 2003: 135). 
That is, people take action, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. Those circumstances 
provide direction to action in three areas in which agents find themselves, in their embodied 
relations to the natural world, their interpersonal relations and their relations to the collective social 
world. In each case agents need to reflect on their responses to the demands of those areas. These 
can be demands of a direct kind, like the need for food to sustain activity, or of a rather more 
indirect but still pressing nature, like the desire to conform to perceived norms. In all cases, agents 
can choose to do other than what is suggested by the circumstances they find themselves is, to cut 
against the grain as it were, but they may have to pay a price for so doing.  
 Now, this is a complex argument, developed at considerable length. From it, I want to develop in 
particular the stress on practice that Archer (2000) gives us in her account of Being Human. Critical 
realism is often seen as being concerned with broader structures, but this might be another 
misreading. For if we turn to the account of the social world given by Roy Bhaskar in his 
Transformational Model of Social Action we encounter a significant term, one which appealed to 
Giddens in his development of structuration theory (Stones, 2005). Whereas Archer uses an outline 
of system-institution-organization-role as key structural components, Bhaskar uses ‘position-
practices’ as an alternative to roles. This draws our attention to the tight coupling of particular 
practices to positions. One aspect of such position-practices in organizations is the routine, 
introduced at the beginning of this discussion. I wish to bring routines in by considering a rather 
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neglected aspect of Bergson’s work, his distinction between instinct, intuition and intelligence. Two 
points are of interest here in the discussion of Bergson’s work that we considered above. One is that 
intuition is discussed in terms of access rather than in terms of being a key way in which actors make 
sense of their world. The second is that this threefold distinction, which is central to Creative 
Evolution, is missing from the accounts we have considered, with the focus being on a rather 
dualistic treatment of intuition and intelligence. 
Bergson (1960) actually commences his discussion with a contrast between instinct and intelligence. 
Evolution, he suggests, has branched in these two directions, with humans developing intelligence. 
Instinct is a reaction to situations, in which knowledge is tightly bound to activity. Two factors shape 
the evolution away from instinct in humans. One is embodied mobility, which puts humans in a 
variety of situations, the unfamiliarity of which challenges any instinctive response. The second is 
language, which means that such a variety of responses can be conceptualised. However, it is 
important that while the intelligence that is developed is distinctive, with its primary characteristic 
being thought as opposed to the activity of instinct, ‘all concrete instinct is mingled with intelligence, 
as all real intelligence is penetrated by instinct’ (Bergson, 1960: 143). However, intelligence 
possesses the key advantage of being mobile, while instinctive knowledge, although deeper and 
richer, remains tightly bound to its object. 
What, then, of intuition, which has formed such an important part of strong process theorizing? ‘By 
intuition’, says Bergson, ‘I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of 
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely’ (Bergson, 1960: 186). This formulation 
suggests the dangers of a strong separation between intelligence and intuition, with intelligence 
being further restricted to particular forms of science. However, it does remain the case that, having 
set up this relationship between intuition and the intellect, he then challenges it. The intellect, he 
argues, being centred on practical challenges, carves up the world and renders it static. To counter 
this there needs to be a turn to intuition and the experience of real duration. Here he is faced with a 
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challenge, because how are we to know that world, other than through intelligence? After all, his 
arguments are couched in the very language that is inadequate to the task. (A problem echoed by 
Linstead when he observes that some accounts (e.g. Chia (1998) and Tsoukas and Chia (2002))  
which draw on Bergson are themselves highly intellectual in character (Linstead, 2014: 227)).  
Bergson’s answer is knowing through action. “In theory,’ he confesses,  ‘there is a kind of absurdity 
in trying to know otherwise than by intelligence; but if the risk be frankly accepted, action will 
perhaps cut the knot that reasoning has tied and will not unloose’ (Bergson, 1960: 203). His analogy 
here is with swimming, which we learn, he suggests by doing, not by the analogy with walking. 
However, it could be objected that this analogy only works in so far as it rests at the common sense 
level of practical coping. If we move, for example, into the world of competitive swimming, then 
swimmers have to unlearn the strokes they have instinctively developed, based on the input of 
intelligence. One can see how strong process theorists have focused on intuition, flow and duration, 
as these are where Bergson leaves us. However, his earlier arguments do tend to suggest a much 
closer relationship between intuition, as theorised instinct, and intelligence. This is especially the 
case if we leave the identification of intelligence with science and return to Bergson’s observation 
that  ‘intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing 
artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture’ 
(Bergson, 1960: 146). 
It is here that I wish to turn to routines, as forms of sedimented practice. While much of the work on 
routines has been focused on performance, creativity and variation, I wish to suggest that this is to 
neglect the extent to which practices become sedimented and endure over time (Feldman 2000; 
Feldman and Pentland, 2003). The extent and nature of that endurance is an empirical matter, 
but I want to draw on the work of Luciana D’Adderio on the importance of Standard Operating 
Procedures in fixing routines. As she observes 
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...formal procedures and rules can always – in theory – be worked around and dismissed, in 
practice they often play a role. Especially when embedded in artefacts such as software, 
and/or entangled into thick organisational interrelationships, they become visible, pervasive, 
difficult to change or avoid, easier to enforce (D’Adderio, 2008: 784). 
These routines provide, I would suggest, the immediate objective structures that actors face when 
they pursue their personal projects. There may be degrees of flexibility in how the constraints that 
they provide are either perceived or navigated, but routines provide situational logics which 
condition action. In some cases they do so by providing what seems to be a natural course of action, 
so response becomes more a matter of instinct, of responses finely tuned to the cues given by a 
situation. In other cases those courses of action can be challenged, but only by paying the 
opportunity costs of so doing. What this suggests is that rather than retreat into a rather mystical 
intuitionism, Bergson’s work might make us consider the relationship between the practical 
products of intelligence, manifested as routines and artefacts, and the instinctual action, action 
mediated by the capacity for reflection manifest in intuition. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, this discussion has only focused on a small part of Bergson’s work seen through the lens of 
what is in turn a large body of work. However, the primary aim was to challenge the association of 
Bergson’s work with a strong process theory. This has been done not by presenting a stark contrast 
between an ontology of flows and movement on the one hand and an ontology of static objects on 
the other, but rather by a suggestion that there are approaches which eschew such a Manichean 
division. In so doing, I have suggested that there are some points of agreement. If one drops notions 
of absolute truth in favour of what Whittington and Mayer (2000: 4) call ‘a modestly generalizing 
social science of management', then we can agree that often an aesthetic response to our world can 
be more revealing. However, it is better to leave such efforts to those who have more aptitude for it; 
our challenge is to seek better understanding of the organizations which shape our lives. Strong 
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process theorists give us little purchase on how this might be done. Indeed, some of their 
suggestions seem contradictory. We have seen this in the injunction to be introspective, a visual 
metaphor which contradicts the emphasis placed on the weakness of sight as a means of knowing. It 
also seems odd to couple the name of Foucault, who was concerned to problematize notions of 
enduring attributes of what it is to be human by providing  contingently situated accounts of the 
conditions of possibility for forms of subjectivity, with a Bergsonian attachment to deep forms of the 
self. A similar comment could be made about yoking Bergson to Bourdieu (Chia and Holt, 2009; 
Nayak and Chia, 2011). For whatever we might say about the nature and constitution of habitus, its 
role in regulating practices is clearly social, in a way that enables us to trace regularities in social 
practice (Chia and Holt, 2006). Those regularities might emerge from habitual engagement with 
practice, but the regularities are collective products. This seems to sit uncomfortably with Bergson’s 
focus on the duration of consciousness against the shadow practices of the social world. The 
problem here seems to be with generalizing from accounts which are focused on individual 
consciousness to the social. It is here that formulations from the tradition of critical realism which 
focus on, as Archer does, the articulation between interior subjective thoughts and the social might 
be more productive. 
One way of doing this is by examining organizational practice, especially routines. Whilst one can 
accept that there can be subtle variations in routines every time they are performed, and that over 
time such variations might lead to changes in their character, routines are one way of recognising 
the relatively enduring sedimentation of process. The degree to which such routines endure is a 
matter of empirical investigation, but such investigation needs to be conditioned by an awareness of 
the ways in which practices sediment and crystallise flows. This is particularly the case when they are 
inscribed in artefacts, with information and communication technology systems being an important 
vehicle for such inscription. Once so inscribed, routines, the product of intellect, become powerful 
shaping forces for the exercise of intuition. One could argue, further, that they shape that very 
intuition by constraining the universe of available options. Such constraints can always be resisted 
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but such resistance bears with it costs. In turn, these routines, borne by artefacts, are the aspects of 
broader structures that actors encounter directly. Those structures are in part the organizational 
structures which provide positions by virtue of which certain actors obtain the power to shape 
routines. However, what might be more significant and enduring are the broader structures of 
thought, what Foucault terms as discourses, which shape what it is possible to say or think at a 
particular time (Pearce and Woodiwiss, 2001). Practices, such as routines, are not simply patterns of 
repeated actions responding to functional needs, but are shaped by what is considered to be 
legitimate and appropriate in particular contexts. If we are take Bergson’s injunctions seriously 
about the way that time is irreversible, so that the past is constantly penetrating the present, then 
we need to consider how the sedimented and enduring products of human activity condition and 
shape what is considered appropriate in the social world.  
This raises some interesting questions about memory and history (Rowlinson, Hassard and, Decker 
2015). While practices, such as organizational routines, are constantly being performed and so often 
subject to subtle changes, their parameters are often strongly conditioned by the past. It is here that 
‘strong’ process theorists and others diverge. For the former, the focus is on memory and the uses of 
history, that is, on how actors in the present mobilize the past in order to act in the present. There is, 
of course, much of interest in such a focus, not least in the way that actors draw on selective 
representations of the past. This is especially the case when powerful actors control what is 
preserved and how it is presented through practices like corporate archives (Foster et al, 2011). 
However, as Bergson noted for the individual, history is not always that which actors remember but 
that which, even if not consciously accessible to present actors, continues to shape their actions. 
One thinks here of the work of Norbert Elias (2000) on what he termed the ‘civilizing process’. Over 
large sweeps of time, he argued, new practices come into being, practices which from a later 
vantage point might seem mundane and obvious, like new forms of cutlery. Taken up initially in elite 
social groups, a process of emulation disseminates practices such as the use of the fork to eat food 
through society until it becomes taken for granted. With such practices come associated ideas of 
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what constitutes civilised conduct, ideas which then themselves form the taken for granted 
backdrop for actions in the present. 
The challenge, of course, is accessing and tracing the history of such processes. Without the direct 
access to practices that ethnographers can obtain, we are left with just the traces of such practices. 
For historians, however, the most valuable documents are those which were produced as an integral 
part of activities, with no thought as to their ultimate preservation (Lipartito, 2014). Such documents 
can be a valuable check of the vagaries of memory. However, by themselves they are mute as to the 
meanings associated with practices such as organizational routines.  Here, as process theorists 
suggest, literature is one valuable resource. The casual anti-Semitism of the English ‘gentleman’ in 
Ford Madox Ford’s (2012) novel of the First World War, Parade’s End, is a minor and passing feature 
of his work, but it is perhaps all the more revealing for that.  It suggests some of the mentalities that 
lay behind the construction of a particularly British view of management, one with a strong focus on 
leadership and character over technical expertise (Mutch, 2006). In some particularly fortunate 
cases we have the survival of diaries, especially those kept with no view to eventual publication, 
which can give access to contemporaneous casts of mind. Combined with a view to examining 
processes, the practices of the historian can help trace how they come to be solidified in practices 
such as routines. 
This distinction between memory and history speaks to a larger concern with process theory, 
mirroring as it does the distinction between ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ in organizational strategy 
promulgated by Chia and Holt. This draws on more sources than Bergson, but Bergson figures 
prominently in the suggestion that we focus more on how strategy is an emergent process best 
developed through a rich absorption in the moment, ‘where detached seeing and contemplation 
give way to a locally sensitive, immersed, guileful and opportunistic form of doing’ (Chia and Holt, 
143).  What the discussion of Bergson at least might suggest is that this is a one-sided view of one 
particular process theorist. We need both building and dwelling, both memory and history, if we are 
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to give an adequate account of organizational practices. However, this discussion of Bergson is not 
just an opportunity to point to some weaknesses in the project of ‘strong’ process thinking. It is also 
to suggest that those influenced by critical realist perspectives, who have tended to place their 
emphasis on the structural constraints on action, might do well to attend to practices, such as 
organizational routines. It is because this is where organizational actors encounter the situational 
logics that the broader factors supply, even if this logic is not immediately obvious. Critical realism is 
an approach that is inherently processual and historical (Mutch, 2014) and as such ought to offer 
much more than the static and reified accounts that caricatured representations of it suggest. 
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